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ConFerenCe SUMMAry
Recent Developments in Consumer Credit
and Payments
1 Stern pointed out an additional rationale 
would be the existence of significant economies 
of scope between the Fed’s retail and wholesale 
payment business (Fedwire), but such economies 
must be rigorously demonstrated.
this summary was prepared by Ronel 
Elul, Joanna Ender, Bob Hunt, and 
James McGrath. elul and hunt are senior 
economists in the research Department of 
the Philadelphia Fed. ender is a research 
analyst in research. McGrath is an 
industry specialist in the bank’s Payment 
Cards Center. the conference agenda, 
papers, and presentations can be found 
at www.philadelphiafed.org/econ/conf/
consumercreditandpayments/index.html. 
n September 29 and 30, 2005, the Federal 
reserve bank of Philadelphia’s research 
Department and Payment Cards Center 
organized the fourth in a series of conferences 
exploring new academic research on the topic of 
consumer credit and payments. nearly 100 participants 
attended the conference, which included seven research 
papers on topics such as the design of consumer 
bankruptcy law, predatory lending, consumers’ choice of 
borrowing terms and indebtedness, the function of credit 
reporting agencies, and pricing in credit card and AtM 
networks.
Keynote speaker Gary H. Stern, 
president of the Federal reserve bank 
of Minneapolis and current chair-
man of the Federal reserve System’s 
Financial Services Policy Committee, 
opened the conference.
Stern began his remarks by point-
ing to the increasing quantity and 
quality of research on consumer credit 
and payments. While the Federal re-
serve System is a significant producer 
of research in this area, it is also an 
important consumer because it acts as 
a provider and, in some instances, a 
regulator of payment services. As with 
monetary economics, good research 
informs good policy decisions, and 
this can be especially important when 
research challenges the conventional 
wisdom.
next Stern described some of the 
differences between the objectives of 
private providers of payment services 
(profit maximization) and the Fed, 
which is to maximize social welfare. 
In particular, the Fed’s mission is to 
encourage the efficiency, accessibility, 
and integrity of the payment system. 
Its ability to make improvements along 
these dimensions depends on the na-
ture of competition in these markets, 
the significant network features of 
most payment systems, and any public-
good aspects that arise in facilitating 
payments. thus, one rationale for the 
Fed’s involvement in a payment market 
might be the existence of significant 
market failure—too little competition 
or too little investment in security 
or reliability, for example—that can-
not be more easily addressed by other 
means (such as regulation).1 When 
such conditions no longer exist, how-
ever, perhaps the Fed should gradually 
exit the market.
Does economic reasoning inform 
the Fed’s choice of which payment 
services to provide and on what scale? 
Stern argued yes, pointing to the Fed’s 
recent decision to reduce its check-pro-
cessing operations, which accounts for 
the majority of the System’s staffing. 
the national check-processing market 
is declining about 10 percent each 
year. If the Fed does not downsize, it 
will account for an ever-growing share 
of the business. but the Fed has deter-
mined that there is no market failure 
in this market that would justify its 
becoming an increasingly important 
provider. nor are there significant 
economies of scope between its check-
processing operations and its other 
payment businesses. 
In response, the Fed has decided 
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more than consumers who chose the 
card without the annual fee. Almost 
half of these borrowers (44 percent) 
paid interest on an average balance 
of $500 or more during the period 
studied. More than half of consumers 
choosing the no fee contract did not 
carry a balance at any time during the 
two-year period. on average at least, 
consumers would appear to be making 
rational choices about loan contracts.
After the fact, however, some 
consumers would have done better had 
they chosen the other contract. For 
example, 24 percent of consumers who 
paid the annual fee never borrowed at 
all. Among consumers who did not pay 
the annual fee, 12 percent paid inter-
est on an average balance of $1,200 
a month or more. In total, about 40 
percent of consumers chose a contract 
that turned out to be more expensive 
(56 percent paying the annual fee 
and 21 percent who didn’t). Are these 
mistakes? or is it that consumers’ bor-
rowing was not what they anticipated 
it would be?  
to explore the possibility that 
consumers are making mistakes, Soule-
les and his co-authors examined a 
subset of consumers who also had sub-
stantial deposits at the bank. the idea 
is that these customers have ample 
liquid funds to help them manage an 
expense shock, so we would not expect 
them to borrow much on their cards or 
to pay the annual fee. not surprisingly, 
only 22 percent of these consumers do 
pay the annual fee (compared to 55 
percent for the entire sample). What is 
surprising, however, is that 10 percent 
DO CONSUMERS CHOOSE THE 
RIGHT CREDIT CONTRACTS?
In the first paper presented, 
Nicholas Souleles, of the University of 
Pennsylvania, reported the results of a 
study (with Sumit Agarwal, Souphala 
Chomsisengphet, and Chunlin Liu) 
that examined consumers’ choice be-
tween two credit card contracts and 
their subsequent borrowing decisions 
in the period 1997 to 1999.2 A large 
U.S. bank offered consumers a choice 
between two credit cards: one with an 
annual fee (about $20) but a lower in-
terest rate and another with no annual 
fee but a higher interest rate (about 
three percentage points higher). Con-
sumers were free to switch from one 
contract to the other at any time.  
to minimize their total borrowing 
costs, consumers expecting to borrow 
a large amount should choose the con-
tract with the annual fee and a lower 
rate. Conversely, consumers who do 
not expect to borrow very much should 
choose the card without an annual 
fee. Did consumers choose rationally? 
When consumers chose a contract that 
turned out to be more expensive for 
them, how likely were they to switch 
contracts?  
Souleles and his co-authors found 
that, on average, consumers who chose 
the card with an annual fee (and lower 
interest rate) subsequently borrowed 
2 “Do Consumers Choose the right Credit 
Contracts?,” mimeo, University of Pennsylvania 
(2005). this paper was previously circulated 
under the title “how Well Do Consumers 
Forecast their Future borrowing?”
Improvements in information-processing 
technology have reduced the cost of ACH 
transactions, leading the Fed to reduce prices 
66 percent over the past decade.
while adjusting its prices to ensure that 
it recovers the full cost of providing 
these services. the Fed also supported 
the recently enacted Check 21 law, 
which will facilitate the electronic 
presentment of checks, thereby reduc-
ing the need to process and ship paper 
checks.
the market for automated clear-
inghouse (ACh) transactions has also 
experienced significant change, and 
the Fed is adapting. on the one hand, 
demand has grown dramatically, a situ-
ation that requires significant ongoing 
investment. on the other hand, pri-
vate-sector providers have consolidated 
and are now increasingly competitive. 
While the Fed remains a dominant 
provider, its market share has fallen 
over time. Improvements in informa-
tion-processing technology, combined 
with significant economies of scale, 
have reduced the cost of ACh transac-
tions, leading the Fed to reduce prices 
66 percent over the past decade.
In each of these cases, economic 
research has aided the Fed’s decision-
making.  Stern offered some examples 
of how economic research could influ-
ence the Fed’s policy decisions in the 
payments arena in the future. First, 
what is the efficacy of alternatives 
to the Fed’s provision of retail pay-
ment services when there are market 
failures? For example, should the Fed 
play a more significant role in standard 
setting, even where it is not an active 
service provider? Second, how will 
the electronification of checks affect 
the market structure and competitive 
conditions of the check processing 
business? third, are the existing theo-
retical models of payment networks 
adequate for making policy decisions 
about whether and how to regulate 
interchange and other fees that arise 
in credit and debit card transactions? 
More economic research in each of 
these areas would help to inform poli-
cymakers and improve social welfare.  Business Review  Q1  2006   37 www.philadelphiafed.org
less, 0.1 percent, made errors that cost 
more than $300 a year. Such low costs 
suggest that many errors may simply 
be due to consumers’ inattention. It 
is even possible that some consumers 
forgot they had the option to switch. 
For those who did pay the annual fee, 
such costs are sunk until the fee comes 
due a year later.
ExPLAINING THE RISE IN 
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCIES
IN THE U.S.
Igor Livshits, of the University 
of Western ontario, presented the 
results of his research (co-written with 
James MacGee and Michèle tertilt), 
which tested a variety of explanations 
for the dramatic rise in bankruptcy 
filings in the U.S. over the last quarter 
century.3  the basic facts are as follows: 
(1) the number of filings increased 
from 1.4 per thousand adults in 1970 
to 8.5 per thousand in 2002; (2) filers’ 
ratio of unsecured debt-to-income has 
increased; and (3) the average real in-
terest rate on unsecured credit hardly 
changed. 
the authors constructed a life-
cycle model of consumers who borrow 
and sometimes default and calibrated 
it to match the behavior of borrowers 
in the U.S. economy during the late 
1990s. they used the model to explore 
the effects of many proposed explana-
tions for the rise in the bankruptcy fil-
ing rate that occurred after 1980. they 
considered a variety of possible expla-
nations for the rise in the bankruptcy 
filing rate and concluded that while no 
single explanation is fully consistent 
with the evidence, a combination of 
factors, including a decline in stigma 
associated with filing for bankruptcy, 
comes reasonably close.
Livshits and his colleagues first 
considered whether an increase in “un-
certainty” can explain the patterns in 
the data. they found that increases in 
the magnitude or likelihood of expense 
shocks (such as out-of-pocket medical 
expenses) or income shocks (such as 
unemployment spells) would increase 
the bankruptcy filing rate, but it would 
also reduce the ratio of unsecured 
debt-to-income, which did not happen. 
the authors also considered shocks to 
family structure (such as divorce or an 
unplanned pregnancy) but found that 
these did not rise after the early 1980s. 
they did find that the decline in the 
share of the adult population that is 
married would explain a small part of 
the rise in the filing rate. they found 
no effect from changes in age structure 
of the population.
Livshits and his co-authors then 
turned to changes in the credit market 
environment. they rejected the poten-
tial effect of the changes in U.S. bank-
ruptcy law introduced in 1978, arguing 
that Canada also experienced a rise in 
bankruptcy filings in the absence of a 
change in its laws. they found the re-
laxation of binding usury ceilings after 
1978 can explain a significant rise in 
bankruptcy filings and an increase in 
the debt-to-income ratio, but it would 
also imply an increase in the real cost 
of unsecured credit that is not ob-
served in the data.4 they are also skep-
tical that in practice the usury ceilings 
are sufficiently restrictive to generate 
such effects. 
they did find two factors that 
seem to be important in explaining the 
of these liquid customers who did not 
pay the annual fee also paid interest 
on an average balance of $1,200 a 
month or more. these customers chose 
a contract that turned out to be more 
expensive because they borrowed a 
significant amount, and yet it seems 
unlikely this was due to unanticipated 
shocks. the authors concluded that 
unanticipated borrowing does not ex-
plain all of the patterns in the data 
next, the authors explored 
whether consumers are likely to choose 
the more affordable contract when the 
cost of mistakes is higher. In particular, 
they calculated the interest consumers 
would have saved if they had paid the 
annual fee to benefit from the lower 
interest rate on their card. When the 
interest savings (net of the annual fee) 
was less than $26, about 37 percent of 
consumers chose the wrong contract. 
but when the interest savings exceeded 
$300, only 7 percent of consumers 
chose the wrong contract. examin-
ing the small share of consumers who 
changed their contracts, the authors 
found that the majority of those ini-
tially chose a contract that turned out 
to be more costly than the alternative. 
they also found that the probability 
that a consumer changes his or her 
contract is significantly affected by the 
net savings that result after the switch. 
 the discussant, John Leahy, of 
new york University, suggested that 
Souleles and his co-authors present a 
formal model of consumers’ contract 
choices to help interpret the pattern of 
mistakes they report. Leahy suggested 
that borrowers might choose the more 
costly contract to discourage them-
selves from borrowing in the future. 
this is an example of a commitment 
problem explored by other research-
ers in the literature. Leahy also noted 
that only 5 percent of borrowers’ er-
rors cost them more than $25 a year; 
only 1 percent made errors that cost 
them more than $100 a year; and even 
3 “Accounting for the rise in Consumer 
bankruptcies,” mimeo, University of Western 
ontario (2005).
4 In Marquette National Bank v. First Omaha 
Service Corp, 439 U.S. 299 (1978), the Supreme 
Court determined that lenders could charge in-
terest rates permitted under the laws of the state 
where they were located, rather than where 
their customers were located. thereafter, states 
competed to attract lenders to their jurisdiction 
by raising their usury ceilings.  38   Q1  2006 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
rise in bankruptcy filings but which 
cannot individually explain the pat-
terns in the data. First, a decline in the 
cost of underwriting unsecured credit 
(perhaps due to rapid improvements 
in information technology) would in-
crease borrowing but would have little 
effect on bankruptcy filing rates and is 
associated with a significant decline in 
average real interest rates. on the oth-
er hand, a decline in the stigma associ-
ated with filing for bankruptcy would 
indeed explain a significant share of 
the increase in filings but would also 
increase real interest rates and reduce 
the ratio of debt-to-income.5
In short, no single explanation 
seems to fit the trends observed in 
the U.S. economy over the last two 
decades. Livshits and his colleagues 
then asked what combination of 
factors would explain the observed 
trends. they argue that increases in 
both expense and income uncertainty, 
combined with a decline in underwrit-
ing costs and stigma, fit the data fairly 
well. In their simulation, increases in 
uncertainty play a relatively small role, 
while a decline in stigma is the pri-
mary driver of the rise in bankruptcy 
filings. At the same time, a decline in 
underwriting costs offsets the effect of 
stigma on interest rates and the ratio 
of debt-to-income. the authors con-
cluded that a decline in stigma plays 
a very important role in the story and 
suggested that it should be the focus of 
future research.
the discussant, Satyajit Chat-
terjee, of the Federal reserve bank of 
Philadelphia, argued that the paper is 
an important advance but its results 
should be interpreted cautiously. For 
example, when the model is calibrated 
to the data, the implied recovery rate 
for debt in bankruptcy is about 28 
percent, which seems rather high for 
a model that seeks to explain filings 
under Chapter 7 (discharges) rather 
than Chapter 13 (workouts). In the 
paper, this is explicitly modeled as 
a wage garnishment, but Chatterjee 
suggested that its high value probably 
reflects other costs omitted from the 
model, such as the nonexempt assets 
subject to liquidation by the court. he 
also wondered how the results would 
change if the assumption of a perfectly 
competitive loan market was relaxed.  
PREDATORY LENDING
the next speaker, Bilge Yilmaz, 
of the University of Pennsylvania, pre-
sented the results of his research (with 
Philip bond and David Musto) on the 
topic of predatory lending. they begin 
by offering a definition of the practice 
and investigating the conditions under 
which it can occur.6
the authors define predatory 
lending as a loan the lender knows 
will, on average, make the borrower 
worse off.  but why would a borrower 
choose a loan that was likely to make 
him or her worse off? In their model 
of a rational loan market, it must be 
5 In their calibrations, the level of stigma re-
quired to explain the filing rate of the early 
1980s is equivalent to the welfare lost from a
28 percent decline in consumption.
the case that lenders know more about 
a borrower’s future income prospects 
than does the borrower. Predatory 
lending has two obvious policy impli-
cations. First, if borrowers are choosing 
loans that are likely to make them 
worse off, credit is being misallocated 
in a way that may be socially waste-
ful. Second, predatory lending may 
increase the inequality in the distribu-
tion of wealth. 
yilmaz and his co-authors develop 
a model in which a borrower applies for 
a loan using his or her home as collat-
eral. the lender has some information 
about whether the borrower is more 
likely a “good” or “bad” risk. borrow-
ers who are good risks are more likely 
to earn sufficient income in the future 
to repay the loan than are borrow-
ers who are bad risks. based on that 
knowledge, the lender makes a loan 
offer, which the borrower either ac-
cepts or declines. If the loan cannot be 
repaid, the lender recoups at least some 
of the proceeds by foreclosing on the 
borrower’s home.
their first insight, according to 
yilmaz, is that in order for predatory 
lending to occur, it must be the case 
that good and bad risks receive the 
same loan terms. In other words, the 
equilibrium must be a pooling equilib-
rium. If that were not the case, the 
lender’s superior information would 
be revealed by his offer: the bad risks 
would realize they faced a higher risk 
of defaulting on the loan than they 
originally thought. In that case, the 
bad risks would not take out the loan. 
When is predatory lending likely 
to occur? yilmaz and his co-authors 
show that several conditions are 
required. First, predatory lending re-
quires that lenders be better informed 
than borrowers about the riskiness 
of the loan. Second, collateral values 
must be sufficiently high, so that lend-
ers do not lose too much if they lend 
to bad borrowers who subsequently 
6 Philip bond, David Musto, and bilge yilmaz, 
“Predatory Lending in a rational World,” 
Federal reserve bank of Philadelphia Working 
Paper 06-2 (2006).
Predatory lending is 
less likely to occur as 
the lending market 
becomes more 
competitive.  Business Review  Q1  2006   39 www.philadelphiafed.org
default.7 third, predatory lending is 
less likely to occur as the lending mar-
ket becomes more competitive because 
rival lenders tend to cherry-pick the 
best borrowers, unraveling the pooling 
equilibrium.8 
the authors examine three poli-
cies that may affect predatory lending. 
they argue that interest-rate ceilings 
(usury laws) can sometimes help re-
duce predatory lending. If the ceiling is 
set sufficiently low, lenders cannot re-
coup the cost of their inefficient loans 
to the bad risks. of course, such a ben-
efit must be weighed against the other 
distortions usury ceilings can cause. 
next, they consider the Community 
reinvestment Act, which requires 
banks to lend in underserved and un-
derprivileged areas. the authors sug-
gest that this can also help break down 
predatory lending if it increases com-
petition in the lending market in such 
areas. note this might imply less actual 
lending in these areas, rather than 
more, because the bad risks choose not 
to borrow. Finally, they consider the 
equal Credit opportunity Act, which 
specifies that certain factors (for ex-
ample, age, race, or gender) may not be 
considered in underwriting or pricing 
loans. If such restrictions do facilitate a 
pooling equilibrium, predatory lending 
may become more likely.
Discussant Andrew Winton, of 
the University of Minnesota, pointed 
to some alternative explanations 
of why a borrower might accept a 
predatory loan. For example, borrow-
ers might not understand the “fine 
9 “Credit registries, relationship banking, and 
Loan repayment,” IeW Working Paper 240, 
University of Zurich (2005). 
print” of loan contracts, or lenders may 
misrepresent loan terms. borrowers 
may exhibit excessive optimism or too 
heavily discount the costs of a loan 
contract that occur in the future. each 
is an example of predatory lending in 
a less than rational world. Winton also 
suggested that, in addition to fore-
closures, the authors should examine 
other costs of predatory loans, includ-




Martin Brown, of the Swiss na-
tional bank, discussed his work with 
Christian Zehnder on the function and 
effects of credit reporting agencies.9 In 
particular, they studied the extent to 
which credit registries improve repay-
ment behavior, an idea that is widely 
accepted but has not been rigorously 
tested in empirical work. they also 
examined another mechanism for 
disciplining borrowers—relationship 
lending, which involves repeated in-
teractions between a specific borrower 
and lender. one question they sought 
to answer was the degree to which 
these two mechanisms are substitutes 
or complements. 
brown and Zehnder developed 
an experiment in which multiple bor-
rowers and lenders interact with each 
other in a computerized lending game. 
there are more lenders than borrow-
ers, so the loan market is relatively 
competitive. the authors examined 
the performance of their experimental 
loan market along two dimensions: 
whether or not a credit bureau exists 
and whether or not borrowers and 
lenders can recognize each other. note 
that if borrowers and lenders cannot 
recognize each other, they cannot en-
gage in relationship lending.
Suppose that borrowers and lend-
ers cannot recognize each other. this 
is consistent with a lending market in 
which borrowers are highly mobile. 
If there is no credit bureau, borrow-
ers are essentially anonymous. In that 
case, the experimental results show 
the market performs extremely poorly 
– borrowers frequently default so few 
lenders offer any funds. next, brown 
and Zehnder introduce a credit bureau. 
this consists of a list lenders receive 
in every period that documents each 
borrower’s previous loans and repay-
ment behavior (no other information 
is provided). With the bureau in place, 
the market functions dramatically bet-
ter, for most rounds of the game. re-
payment rates and lending volume are 
significantly higher. 
 brown and Zehnder attribute 
this improvement in results to the 
disciplining effect of credit registries; 
borrowers are willing to repay in order 
to maintain reputations and hence re-
tain access to future credit. As further 
evidence, they point to the following 
detail from their experimental results. 
In the final periods of the game, the 
market breaks down even in the pres-
ence of a credit bureau. borrowers rec-
ognize that they have no further need 
to maintain their reputation and lend-
ers, recognizing this, decline to lend.  
next, brown and Zehnder con-
sidered the case where borrowers and 
lenders can recognize each other, 
which makes ongoing lending relation-
ships possible between specific bor-
rowers and lenders. they found that 
even in the absence of a credit bureau, 
the loan market functions very well. 
thus lending relationships also ap-
pear to act as an effective mechanism 
for disciplining borrowers. When a 
credit bureau is introduced in this 
environment, there is a slight increase 
in performance, but the difference is 
7 they point out that loans that increase the 
value of collateral, such as home-improvement 
loans, may therefore increase the prospects for 
predatory lending.
8 Still, as long as loans are fully collateralized, 
the authors show that predatory lending re-
mains a possibility even under highly competi-
tive conditions.40   Q1  2006 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
not statistically significant. brown and 
Zehnder conclude that credit bureaus 
and relationship lending are largely 
substitutes.   
Discussant Paul S. Calem (Loan-
Performance) argued that the paper 
raises several potential policy implica-
tions.  It clearly provides evidence of 
the contributions that credit bureaus 
can make—they make it possible for 
consumers to invest in their reputa-
tions as good borrowers. this, in turn, 
increases the availability and pricing 
of credit. 
but Calem pointed out that the 
experiment is highly stylized so it is 
important to place the results in the 
context of actual credit markets. For 
example, in the U.S. at least, there 
are markets in which credit bureaus 
dominate (consumer credit) and other 
markets where relationship lending is 
more important (small-business lend-
ing). In addition, he pointed out that 
while relationship lending may serve as 
another mechanism for enforcing re-
payment, it does have some drawbacks. 
For example, it may suffer from “lock-
in” where the cost of changing lending 
relationships results in less competi-
tive pricing. returning to brown and 
Zehnder’s experiment, Calem noted it 
would be interesting to know whether 
the presence of a credit bureau has 
a significant effect on the pricing of 
loans or whether the incremental con-
tribution of credit bureaus depends on 
competitive conditions.
Finally, while the paper is silent 
on these questions, Calem pointed 
out that the actual content of credit 
bureau files may be important factors. 
brown and Zehnder’s credit bureaus 
include both positive and negative 
credit information, but many bureaus 
around the world include only negative 
information. In addition, the optimal 
length of credit histories included in 
bureau files is open to debate. If re-
cords are kept too long, marginal bor-
rowers may feel that their record can 
never be rehabilitated, and this would 
weaken the discipline that credit bu-
reaus are supposed to enable.
THE EFFECTS OF INCOMPLETE 
INFORMATION ON CONSUMER 
CREDIT
Jonathan Zinman (Dartmouth 
College) presented the results of his 
work with Dean Karlan. they have 
designed an empirical study that seeks 
to identify adverse selection and moral 
hazard in loan markets.10 In other 
words, do higher interest rate loans 
attract riskier clients? (this is known 
as adverse selection.) Do higher inter-
est rate loans induce borrowers to take 
more risks (i.e., moral hazard)? how 
can the two be separately measured? 
Despite an abundance of theoretical 
work, there is remarkably little empiri-
cal research on these questions. 
Karlan and Zinman implemented 
their experiment through a South Af-
rican lender specializing in providing 
unsecured credit to the working poor. 
their typical loans are small ($150) 
and the term is rather short (four 
months). their experiment consisted 
of three stages. In the initial stage an 
interest rate (the offer rate) was ran-
domly assigned to a pool of potential 
borrowers with similar observable 
characteristics. this rate could be 
either high or low. In the next stage, 
among the clients who respond to the 
offer, approximately 40 percent were 
randomly given a low contract rate 
instead (the remainder received the 
original offer rate). Finally, half of the 
applicants were randomly given a dy-
namic repayment incentive—assuming 
the borrower repaid the current loan, 
he or she would receive a favorable in-
terest rate on subsequent loans over the 
next year.  
to test for adverse selection, Kar-
lan and Zinman compared the repay-
ment performance of two groups: bor-
rowers who responded to the low offer 
rate and borrowers who responded to 
the high offer rate but subsequently 
received the lower contract rate. this 
is the test for adverse selection. Since 
both groups actually received the low 
interest rate in this experiment, there 
should be no effect of moral hazard. 
the question remains: Do higher in-
terest rates attract riskier borrowers 
who care less about high rates because 
they are less likely to repay the loan?
next, the authors constructed 
two tests for moral hazard. recall that 
moral hazard exists when the terms 
of credit affect an individual’s incen-
tives to repay his or her loan. Karlan 
and Zinman begin by focusing only on 
those borrowers who responded to the 
high offer rate. this should remove 
the effects of adverse selection, be-
cause these borrowers should initially 
have the same expectations about 
their prospects for repaying the loan. 
In the first test, Karlan and Zinman 
compared the repayment performance 
of borrowers who actually received a 
10 “observing Unobservables: Identifying Infor-
mation Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit 
Field experiment,” Working Paper (2005).
Credit bureaus make it possible for 
consumers to invest in their reputations as 
good borrowers.  This, in turn, increases the 
availability and pricing of credit.  Business Review  Q1  2006   41 www.philadelphiafed.org
12 “Skewed Pricing in two-Sided Markets: An 
Io Approach,” Dnb Working Paper 2004/13, 
De nederlandsche bank, Amsterdam (2004).
lower contract rate with those who 
paid at the original offer rate. Moral 
hazard would then show up if the sec-
ond group—that with the higher inter-
est rate—is more likely to default. 
Karlan and Zinman also consid-
ered a second, potentially cleaner test 
for the effects of moral hazard. Under 
the first test the fact that one group is 
paying a higher interest rate than the 
other implies there is a higher repay-
ment burden, which in itself may lead 
to differences in subsequent repayment 
behavior, even in the absence of moral 
hazard. In their second test, Karlan 
and Zinman compared the repayment 
behavior of borrowers who were offered 
the favorable rate on future loans with 
those who were not.11 If those offered 
this dynamic repayment incentive 
perform better, this would also provide 
evidence of moral hazard (since it re-
flects the effect of incentives on repay-
ment behavior). 
 Karlan and Zinman found the 
problem of asymmetric information 
to be relevant in these loan markets. 
they estimate that about 20 percent 
of the overall default rate can be at-
tributed to a combination of adverse 
selection and moral hazard. Moreover, 
the strongest evidence of moral hazard 
is identified when examining the effect 
of the dynamic repayment incentive—
a one-percentage-point decrease in the 
cost of future loans reduces the default 
rate on the current loan by about 4 
percentage points. Interestingly, they 
found that the particular type of infor-
mation problem depended on the gen-
der of the borrower. Lending to female 
borrowers appeared to suffer from the 
adverse selection problem, while lend-
ing to male borrowers appeared to suf-
fer from the moral hazard problem.  
the discussant, Pierre-Andre 
Chiappori (Columbia University), 
stated this was extremely important 
research. Distinguishing between 
adverse selection and moral hazard is 
important because each has distinct 
welfare implications and policy pre-
scriptions. he suggested the analysis 
might benefit from a structural model. 
In particular, he wondered about how 
the competitive structure of the loan 
markets might influence the results 
and even the form of loan contracts. 
Some people might not respond to 
high rate offers because they receive 
better offers elsewhere. What alterna-
tives are available to potential bor-
rows? Do these depend on gender? Can 
that explain the differences in results 
for men and women?  
PRICING IN CONSUMER 
PAYMENT NETWORKS
Alexander Tieman (Internation-
al Monetary Fund) presented a paper 
co-authored with Wilko bolt that 
examines pricing behavior in two-sided 
markets.12 A two-sided market is one 
in which there are two distinct types 
of end users that derive benefits from 
interacting with each other, which is 
Do higher interest rate 
loans attract riskier 
borrowers? Do higher 
interest rate loans 
induce borrowers to 
take more risks?
typically facilitated by a network or 
platform. they focus on the concrete 
example of a consumer payment net-
work, such as Visa or MasterCard, 
which facilitates transactions between 
merchants and consumers. 
two-sided markets often exhibit 
positive externalities. In the case of 
payment networks, the value of hold-
ing a card for consumers is increasing 
in the number of merchants willing to 
accept the card. Conversely, the value 
to merchants of agreeing to accept a 
payment card is increasing the number 
of consumers that are willing to use it.  
thus participants on each side of the 
market would benefit from subsidies 
that increase demand among partici-
pants on the other side. one role of 
payment networks, then, is to coordi-
nate the incentives offered to consum-
ers and merchants. 
bolt and tieman point out that 
in such markets there is both a price 
and a price structure. In this case, price 
refers to the total cost of transactions 
paid by the merchant and the con-
sumer, while price structure refers to 
the share of the total price that is paid 
by each party. both are set directly, or 
indirectly, by the network. the distinc-
tion is important because it is possible 
that one party, perhaps the consumer, 
may not pay anything for the transac-
tion or may even receive a subsidy for 
using a payment card. this appears 
to be the case for debit cards in the 
netherlands, for example. Such skewed 
pricing structures are receiving a good 
deal of scrutiny by antitrust authorities 
around the world and are the focus of 
a number of lawsuits in the U.S.
the economic literature on two-
sided networks is relatively new and 
underdeveloped.13 tieman points out 
13 For an accessible review of the literature, 
see bob hunt’s 2003 Business Review article 
at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/files/br/
brq203bh.pdf.
11 Since both groups are currently paying the 
same interest rate, there is no difference in re-
payment burden that may cloud the interpreta-
tion of the results.42   Q1  2006 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
that in many theoretical models of 
these markets, the equilibrium price 
structure does not look like what we 
often observe in consumer payment 
networks. Instead of skewed pricing, 
where one side of the market pays all 
(or more) of the cost of a transaction, 
these models tend to generate interior 
pricing, where each side of the market 
contributes to the cost of a transac-
tion. In addition the share of total 
transaction costs paid by one side of 
the market is inversely related to the 
relative price elasticity of demand.14 
Put more simply, the side of the mar-
ket whose demand is most sensitive to 
changes in price bears the larger share 
of the total cost of the transaction. 
this is exactly opposite the intuition 
learned from the microeconomic anal-
ysis of a traditional market. 
In their paper, bolt and tieman 
report that such results follow from 
a particular assumption about the 
properties of the demand curves (log 
concavity). If a more traditional as-
sumption about demand curves (con-
stant elasticity of substitution) is used 
instead, the results are very different. 
In that case, the side of the market 
that is least sensitive to price changes 
will bear the larger share of total trans-
action costs. And if one side of the 
market (e.g., consumers) is sufficiently 
more sensitive to changes in prices 
than the other (e.g., merchants), it will 
bear none of the transactions costs. 
Indeed, a profit-maximizing network 
would choose to subsidize consumers, 
financing the subsidy at least in part by 
raising the price paid by merchants. In 
short, their model derives a price struc-
ture that looks like what is observed in 
many consumer payment networks.
14 by price elasticity, we mean the decline in 
transaction volume, expressed in percentage 
terms, induced by an increase in transaction 
price, also expressed in percentage terms.
next, bolt and tieman turned to 
policy questions. how does the pricing 
strategy of a profit-maximizing network 
compare to that of a benevolent social 
planner? they found that a social 
planner would also choose a highly 
skewed price structure, but a lower 
total price than would a profit-maxi-
mizing network. thus, a monopoly 
payment network would result in too 
few, rather than too many, transac-
tions. In contrast, a social planner 
would run the network at a loss, which 
would require ongoing subsidies from 
some other part of the economy. If the 
network was required to break even, 
it is likely that all the costs would be 
recovered from prices charged on only 
one side of the network. 
bolt and tieman concluded that 
the existence of skewed pricing in 
itself does not justify intervention by 
antitrust authorities, but a concern 
for the overall price charged might. 
this stands in contrast to the public 
debate, which focuses primarily on 
skewed pricing rather than on the total 
prices charged by consumer payment 
networks.
the discussant, Rafael Rob (Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania), distinguished 
between the two types of equilibria 
explored in models of this sort. Most 
papers in the literature focus on an 
interior equilibrium where not all 
consumers and merchants adopt the 
payment technology. bolt and tieman, 
on the other hand, focus on the cor-
ner solutions where there is universal 
adoption by one or both sides of the 
market. rob pointed out that models 
in the existing literature can also gen-
erate corner solutions if the disparities 
in price elasticities are sufficiently 
great, but they may not have the same 
properties as the ones explored by bolt 
and tieman. rob also pointed out that 
this is a model of a monopoly provider 
of payment services. While this is a 
good approximation of the Dutch debit 
card market, the U.S. credit and debit 
card networks are a duopoly. It would 
be interesting to explore whether the 
results are sensitive to this distinction.
ATM SURCHARGES AND 
CONSUMER WELFARE
Gautam Gowrisankaran (Wash-
ington University, St. Louis) presented 
his paper with John Krainer that ex-
plores the potential gains and losses as-
sociated with the introduction of AtM 
surcharges in the 1990s.15 Surcharges 
are fees charged to consumers by own-
ers of an AtM. Prior to 1996, AtM 
surcharges were extremely rare, but 
thereafter they became very common. 
this change had two effects. on 
the one hand, AtMs became more 
profitable, which stimulated the de-
ployment of AtMs and reduced the 
distance consumers must travel in 
order to access their deposit accounts. 
on the other hand, consumers were 
now required to pay for the privilege of 
using at least some AtMs. In addition, 
the increase in AtMs exceeded the 
increase in transaction volume so that 
the average number of transactions per 
machine fell. Since most of the cost of 
operating an AtM is fixed, the decline 
in transaction volume implies that the 
15 “the Welfare Consequences of AtM 
Surcharges: evidence from a Structural entry 
Model,” Federal reserve bank of San Francisco 
Working Paper 2005-01 (2005).
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payment networks 
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average cost of each transaction rose 
significantly.
Gowrisankaran and Krainer asked 
whether, on balance, consumers and 
society were made better or worse off 
by the introduction of AtM surcharg-
es. In practice, this simple question 
is very difficult to answer. to do so, 
Gowrisankaran and Krainer painstak-
ingly gathered a data set of AtM loca-
tions, potential AtM locations (gro-
cery stores and banks), and population 
in 32 counties along the border of two 
states, Minnesota and Iowa. they 
chose this area because, unlike Min-
nesota, Iowa enforced a no-surcharge 
law throughout the 1990s. In principle, 
differences in the deployment and use 
of AtMs in these border counties can 
be used to estimate the effects of a 
surcharge ban. but to do so, Gowrisan-
karan and Krainer also had to develop 
a structural model of the AtM market 
and some novel approaches to estimat-
ing the parameters of the model.
to estimate their model 
efficiently, the authors needed to avoid 
calculating equilibrium outcomes 
for every possible combination of 
parameter values. While this has 
been done for other models of entry, 
Gowrisankaran and Krainer were at 
a disadvantage—they did not know 
what the prices (surcharges) were 
in Minnesota. their insight was to 
estimate the entry model using data 
from Iowa counties (where prices = 0) 
and, using those coefficients, estimate 
the effects of nonzero prices using data 
from Minnesota counties. 
Assuming that the fixed cost of 
deploying AtMs and consumer prefer-
ences are similar in counties on either 
side of the Minnesota-Iowa border, 
the difference in the relative number 
and geographic dispersion of AtMs 
between the two states can be used to 
infer something about the price elas-
ticity of demand. All else equal, the 
greater these differences, the less elas-
tic is the demand curve for AtMs.  In 
the actual estimation, they found that 
the probability a consumer will use a 
given AtM falls equally as much if the 
AtM is moved 1 kilometer away or she 
is required to pay 8 to 10 cents more to 
use it. they conclude that consumer 
demand for transactions at AtMs is 
price elastic.
Using estimates from their model, 
Gowrisankaran and Krainer calculated 
measures of consumer and producer 
surplus that result under a no sur-
charge regime and one that permits 
surcharging. they reported little 
difference in the total surplus gener-
ated but significant differences in its 
distribution. While fewer AtMs are 
deployed in a no surcharge regime, the 
estimated consumer surplus is about 10 
percent higher (and producer surplus 
10 percent lower) than in a regime 
that permits surcharging. transaction 
volume is also about 16 percent higher 
in the no surcharge regime. they also 
derived the first best outcome, where 
consumers are charged only the mar-
ginal cost of a transaction and fixed 
costs are recovered via lump sum tax-
es. Compared to the surcharge regime, 
there are 50 percent more AtMs and 
38 percent more transactions, and the 
Since most of the cost of operating an ATM is 
fixed, the decline in transaction volume implies 
that the average cost of each transaction rose 
significantly.
total surplus is 14 percent higher. 
the discussant, James McAn-
drews (Federal reserve bank of new 
york), pointed to one of the simplify-
ing assumptions of the paper—that the 
market for AtM transactions is inde-
pendent of the market for other bank 
services. If that assumption is relaxed, 
differences in the market structure of 
banking between the two states might 
influence AtM deployment and pric-
ing decisions. It is then possible that at 
least some of the effects attributed to a 
surcharge ban might actually be driven 
by differences in banking structure. 
McAndrews presented evidence 
that banking markets in the Minne-
sota border counties are indeed dif-
ferent from those in the Iowa border 
counties. he conjectured that Minne-
sota’s single-office banks were likely 
to charge lower foreign fees.16 on the 
other hand, he conjectured that since 
the banking market in Iowa was more 
concentrated, surcharges may be lower 
because competition for deposits is less 
intense.17 the net effect, McAndrews 
argued, is that the benefits of surcharg-
ing may be exaggerated.
16 Foreign fees are fees a bank charges its own 
customers when they use an AtM the bank 
does not own.
17 one reason banks may surcharge consumers 
that are not their own customers is to encourage 
them to become customers. 
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